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SMITH v. CITY OF JACKSON: THE 
AGE DISCRIMINATION ACT 
AUTHORIZES DISPARATE IMPACT 
CLAIMS, BUT ONLY IN NARROW 
CIRCUMSTANCES 
BRIAN HOLLADAY* 
Before the Supreme Court decided Hazen Paper Co. v. Biggins1 in 
1993, claims for the disparate impact theory of discrimination under 
the Age Discrimination in Employment Act (ADEA) were available 
in every circuit.2 Ironically, in Hazen Paper the plaintiff did not pursue 
a claim under disparate impact, and instead proceeded solely on a 
theory of disparate treatment.3 Justice O’Connor, writing for the 
unanimous Court, emphasized that disparate treatment requires a 
finding of employer motivation to discriminate, but disparate impact 
does not.4 The Court found that “[d]isparate treatment, thus defined, 
captures the essence of what Congress sought to prohibit in the 
ADEA.”5 The opinion also noted, “we have never decided whether a 
disparate impact theory of liability is available under the ADEA . . . 
and we need not do so here.”6 
In the aftermath of Hazen Paper, circuit courts were unsure of 
how to interpret the Court’s cryptic comments about disparate impact 
 
 *  2006 J.D. Candidate, Duke University School of Law 
 1. Hazen Paper Co. v. Biggins, 507 U.S. 604 (1993). 
 2. Smith v. City of Jackson, 125 S. Ct. 1536, 1542–43 (2005). 
 3. Hazen, 507 U.S. at 610. 
 4. Id. at 609; see also Teamsters v. United States, 431 U.S. 324, 335–36 n.15 (1977) 
(explaining that in disparate treatment claims, “the employer simply treats some people less 
favorably than others because of their race, color, religion, sex, or national origin. Proof of 
discriminatory motive is critical . . . . [Disparate impact claims] involve employment practices 
that are facially neutral in their treatment of different groups but that in fact fall more harshly 
on one group than another and cannot be justified by business necessity. Proof of discriminatory 
motive . . . is not required under a disparate-impact theory”) (citations omitted). 
 5. Id. at 610. 
 6. Id. 
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in the ADEA. The Second, Eighth, and Ninth Circuits continued to 
allow disparate impact claims. In contrast, the First, Fifth, Seventh, 
Tenth, and Eleventh Circuits interpreted the comments to disfavor 
disparate impact and refused to allow them.7 
It was into this confusing legal landscape that Smith v. City of 
Jackson entered in 1999. In May of that year, the city of Jackson, 
Mississippi, revised the salary structure for its police and public safety 
officers.8 The city’s new structure granted salary increases to all police 
officers and public safety dispatchers.9 In an effort to make starting 
salaries regionally competitive, the increases were proportionally 
higher for officers with less than five years of seniority.10 Most of the 
officers with greater than five years of seniority were over the age of 
forty.11 After the pay raise was instituted, thirty police officers and 
public safety dispatchers over the age of forty filed an age 
discrimination suit against the city.12 The plaintiffs pursued claims 
under both disparate treatment and disparate impact theories of 
liability.13 
With only the Supreme Court’s dicta in Hazen Paper as a guide, 
the district court was greeted with a case of first impression on the 
question of the availability of a disparate impact claim.14 The district 
court ruled that disparate impact was not available under the 
ADEA.15 The district court granted the defendant’s motion for 
summary judgment,16 and the plaintiffs appealed the district court’s 
ruling to the Fifth Circuit. A three judge panel affirmed the district 
court’s grant of summary judgment against the plaintiffs on the 
 
 7. See Smith, 125 S. Ct. at 1543 n.9 (finding that “in contrast to the First, Seventh, Tenth, 
and Eleventh Circuits, which have held that there is no disparate-impact theory, the Second, 
Eighth, and Ninth Circuits continue to recognize such a theory”) (citations omitted). See also 
Smith v. City of Jackson, 351 F.3d 183, 184 (5th Cir. 2003) (holding in the decision below that 
the Fifth Circuit does not recognize a disparate-impact theory of liability). 
 8. Smith, 125 S. Ct. at 1539. 
 9. Smith, 351 F.3d at 184. 
 10. Smith, 125 S. Ct. at 1539. 
 11. Id. 
 12. Smith, 351 F.3d at 184–85. 
 13. Smith, 125 S. Ct. at 1539. 
 14. See Smith, 351 F.3d at 184. 
 15. Id. (finding also that the plaintiffs did not present sufficient evidence on the disparate 
treatment claim to survive summary judgment). 
 16. Id. 
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grounds that the ADEA does not authorize disparate impact claims,17 
though one judge dissented.18 
The plaintiffs appealed, and the Supreme Court granted certiorari. 
The rift among circuits foreshadowed the contentious Supreme Court 
decision, which rested on an unlikely coalition forged between Justice 
Scalia and Justices Stevens, Souter, Ginsburg, and Breyer. Justice 
Stevens wrote the plurality opinion, joined by Justices Souter, 
Ginsburg, and Breyer. Justice Scalia concurred in part and concurred 
in judgment. The plurality held that the ADEA does authorize claims 
under a theory of disparate impact.19 The Court overruled the lower 
court on both the legal principle and application of the principle to 
this case.20 In opposition, Justice O’Connor wrote a concurring 
opinion that Justices Kennedy and Thomas joined. Although her 
opinion found little common ground with Justice Stevens’s plurality 
opinion, the concurring opinion ultimately dictated the same 
disposition of the case, and this may be viewed as a concurrence. 
The disagreement between the plurality and concurrence began 
with their differing interpretations of the statutory history of the 
ADEA. In examining the ADEA’s statutory history, both the plurality 
and the concurrence analyzed a report written by Secretary of Labor 
Willard Wirtz in 1965. The Secretary’s findings, commonly known as 
the “Wirtz Report,” were the result of a request by Congress for a 
“study of the factors which might tend to result in discrimination in 
employment because of age.”21 Congress also asked the Secretary to 
propose statutory language to remedy the problems addressed in the 
report.22 Because Congress adopted the proposed language in the 
ADEA, both the plurality23 and concurrence24 viewed the Wirtz 
Report as a reliable source of Congressional intent. 
 
 17. Id. 
 18. Id. at 199. 
 19. Smith v. City of Jackson, 125 S. Ct. 1536, 1540 (2005). 
 20. See id. at 1546 (stating that because the Supreme Court overruled the Fifth Circuit on 
both the legal principle and the application of that principle to this case, the Supreme Court 
agreed with the Fifth Circuit that the defendant’s motion for summary judgment should be 
granted. Ironically, the Supreme Court therefore “affirmed” the Fifth Circuit). 
 21. Id. at 1540. 
 22. Id. at 1552 (O’Connor, J., concurring). 
 23. See id. at 1540 (majority opinion) (stating that Congress enacted ADEA legislation in 
response to the Wirtz Report). 
 24. Id. at 1552 (O’Connor, J., concurring). 
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The Wirtz Report identified three common instances in which 
older workers were treated differently than younger workers. The first 
was disparate treatment of older workers based on unfounded 
assumptions about the effects of age.25 The second and third instances 
were examples of age-based classifications that had a disparate impact 
on older workers. Neither instance involved an actual employer’s 
intent to discriminate. The second instance was differentiation based 
on the actual effects of age.26 Finally, the third instance entailed 
classifications, such as seniority, that should have benefited older 
workers but may have practically worked against them by making 
them more costly to employ.27 The Secretary advised the first category 
be remedied by legislation.28 In contrast, the Secretary recommended 
the second and third categories be corrected through “noncoercive 
measures” such as programs and education.29 The concurrence saw 
these noncoercive measures as the exclusive remedy of the ADEA 
under claims of disparate impact. Based on the Wirtz Report, Justice 
O’Connor concluded that “intentional discrimination was clearly 
distinguished from circumstances and practices merely having a 
disparate impact on older workers, which—as ADEA sections 2, 3, 
and 5 make clear—Congress intended to address through research, 
education, and possible future legislative action.”30 
The concurrence’s interpretation was “not persuasive” to the 
plurality.31 Instead, the plurality stated that Congress meant the 
coercive measures to be merely a partial solution. After examining 
the Wirtz Report, Justice Stevens found, “there is nothing to suggest 
that [Congress] intended such measures to be the sole method of 
achieving the desired result of remedying practices that had an 
adverse effect on older workers.”32 
The Wirtz Report was not the only matter of statutory history that 
divided the Justices; the plurality and concurrence also reached 
different conclusions about the degree of similarity between the 
ADEA and Title VII. The comparison is important because the 
 
 25. Id. at 1553. 
 26. Id. 
 27. Id. at 1553–54. 
 28. Id. at 1554. 
 29. Id. at 1554. 
 30. Id. at 1554–55. 
 31. Id. at 1543 n.7. 
 32. Id. 
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Supreme Court in Griggs v. Duke Power33 interpreted Title VII to 
authorize disparate impact claims, and part of the language 
interpreted was identical to the language contained in the ADEA.34 In 
addition to the same language, the two statutes have similar purposes 
and were enacted one shortly after the other.35 Invoking a rule of 
statutory construction, the plurality explained that when statutes are 
similar in language, purpose, and time, “it is appropriate to presume 
that Congress intended that text to have the same meaning in both 
statutes.”36 Thus, the plurality held that the Griggs finding of disparate 
impact also applies to the ADEA.37 In contrast, the concurrence found 
“significant textual differences between Title VII and the ADEA that 
indicate differences in congressional intent.”38 
Still, the Justices’ arguments were not limited to statutory history. 
The plurality and concurrence also clashed on points of statutory 
interpretation. One such clash concerned Section 623(a)(2), which 
was read in relation to Section 623(a)(1). Section 623(a)(1) made it 
illegal for an employer “to fail or refuse to hire or to discharge any 
individual or otherwise discriminate against any individual with 
respect to his compensation, terms, conditions, or privileges of 
employment, because of such individual’s age.”39 Section 623(a)(2) 
dictated that no employer could “limit, segregate, or classify his 
employees in any way which would deprive or tend to deprive any 
individual of employment opportunities or otherwise adversely affect 
his status as an employee, because of such individual’s age.”40 
Both the plurality and concurrence agreed that Section 623(a)(1) 
did not authorize disparate impact claims. Instead, their disagreement 
focused on Section 623(a)(2)—the provision that the plurality 
believed to authorize disparate impact liability because of its textual 
differences from Section 623(a)(1). The plurality focused on the 
language, “otherwise adversely affect” in Section 623(a)(2) to 
 
 33. Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424 (1971). 
 34. Smith, 125 S. Ct. at 1541. 
 35. Id. 
 36. Id. 
 37. Id. at 1542. 
 38. Id. at 1557 (O’Connor, J., concurring). The two textual differences the concurrence 
points to are the meaning of 29 U.S.C. § 623(a)(2) (2000) and the defense for actions based on 
“reasonable factors other than age.” Id. at 1551. 
 39. 29 U.S.C. § 623(a)(1) (2000). 
 40. 29 U.S.C. § 623(a)(2) (2000). 
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highlight that the provision prohibited effects of the employer’s 
action, even in the absence of an intent to discriminate.41 
In addition, the plurality believed that Section 623(a)(2) contained 
an incongruity between the employer’s action and the individual 
employee.42 This incongruity stemmed from Congress’s use of the 
plural “his employees” in the first part of the provision and then the 
singular “any individual” and “his status” in the latter part of the 
provision.43 According to the plurality, the incongruity showed that an 
employer could be held liable for an employment action that had a 
discriminatory effect on an employee because of his age, even if the 
employer had no intent to discriminate, and that this was “the very 
definition of disparate impact.”44 
The concurrence saw no incongruity in Section 623(a)(2). Instead, 
they viewed the difference in the provisions as the result of the type 
of acts prohibited by Section 623(a)(2).45 According to the 
concurrence, Section 623(a)(1) prohibited acts that were inherently 
damaging to employees, but Section 623(a)(2) dealt with acts that 
were not necessarily damaging.46 Accordingly, Congress inserted the 
language “in any way which would deprive or tend to deprive any 
individual of employment opportunities or otherwise adversely affect 
his status as an employee” to explain that the acts in Section 623(a)(2) 
were prohibited.47 
Moreover, the plain meaning the concurring justices drew from 
the statute differed from that of the plurality. The concurrence began 
its argument with the fact that Section 623(a)(1) did not authorize 
disparate impact liability. It then attempted to prove that the language 
“because of such individual’s age” had the same meaning in Section 
623(a)(1) and in Section 623(a)(2). In support, the concurring justices 
noted that the language is identical and appeared in consecutive 
paragraphs.48 They then argued, based on statutory construction, that 
the comma before “because of such individual’s age” indicated that 
 
 41. Smith, 125 S. Ct. at 1542. 
 42. See id. at 1542 n.6. 
 43. Id. 
 44. Id. 
 45. See id. at 1550 (O’Connor , J., concurring). 
 46. Id. 
 47. Id. (quoting 29 U.S.C. § 623(a)(2) (2000)). 
 48. Id. 
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the “because of” language modified the entire provision, rather than 
only the phrase that appeared directly before it.49 
Sections 623(a)(1) and 623(a)(2) were not the only provisions of 
the statute that draw the Justices’ attention. The plurality and 
concurrence also supported their positions by pointing to Section 
623(f)(1), the “reasonable factors other than age” (“RFOA”) 
provision, which provides: “[i]t shall not be unlawful for an employer  
. . . to take any action otherwise prohibited . . . where the 
differentiation is based on reasonable factors other than age.”50 
According to the plurality, the RFOA clause showed Congress 
authorized disparate impact claims in the ADEA because without 
disparate impact the clause would be redundant.51 The plurality’s 
reasoning began with the premise that disparate treatment included a 
finding of employer motivation to discriminate, which was not present 
if the employment action was based on a factor other than age.52 
Because the employment action protected by the RFOA clause is not 
disparate treatment, it must instead be disparate impact.53 If the 
ADEA did not authorize disparate impact, the plurality concluded, 
the RFOA clause would only provide a defense for employers who 
have not violated the act.54 
The concurrence conceded that the RFOA clause in the absence 
of disparate impact was “arguably redundant” but believed that the 
duplication was intentional.55 According to the concurrence, the 
duplication was the result of “Congress’ abundance of caution” in 
protecting employers who act without the intent to discriminate on 
the basis of age.56 Justice O’Connor found, “[t]he role of this 
protection is to afford employers an independent safe harbor from 
liability.”57 In addition to the safe harbor argument, the concurrence 
 
 49. Id. 
 50. 29 U.S.C. § 623(f)(1) (2000). 
 51. See Smith, 125 S. Ct. at 1544 (reasoning that “[i]n most disparate-treatment cases, if an 
employer in fact acted on a factor other than age, the action would not be prohibited under 
subsection (a) in the first place. In those disparate-treatment cases, such as in Hazen Paper 
itself, the RFOA provision is simply unnecessary to avoid liability under the ADEA, since there 
was no prohibited action in the first place”) (citations omitted). 
 52. Id. 
 53. Id. 
 54. See id. (quoting Texas Dep’t of Cmty. Affairs v. Burdine, 450 U.S. 248, 254 (1981)). 
 55. Id. at 1551 (O’Connor, J., concurring). 
 56. Id. 
 57. Id. at 1551 (emphasis in original). 
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also pointed to two functions of the RFOA clause that were not 
related to disparate impact. First, in mixed motive claims, the clause 
provided a defense to employers who act based on a reasonable 
factor other than age, even if age also had some influence on the 
decision.58 Second, the requirement that the factor be reasonable 
would prevent employers from avoiding liability by citing 
unreasonable factors as mere pretexts for age discrimination.59 
The sum of the Justices’ interpretation of the ADEA’s history and 
text was that five members of the Court agreed the ADEA 
authorized disparate impact claims. Those five votes came from the 
unlikely coalition of Justice Scalia and the four historically liberal 
Justices—Stevens, Souter, Ginsburg, and Breyer. Justice Scalia based 
his decision, which concurred in part and concurred in judgment, on a 
Chevron U.S.A. Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc. 
administrative law analysis.60 According to Justice Scalia, the EEOC’s 
regulation recognizing disparate impact for the ADEA was 
reasonable and therefore worthy of judicial deference.61 Justice 
Scalia’s defection may have been abetted by the leadership void 
among the conservative Justices left by the absence of Chief Justice 
Rehnquist who did not participate in the case because he was battling 
thyroid cancer. Had he been in the chambers, the Chief Justice may 
have been able to persuade Justice Scalia to view the case in the same 
manner as Justices O’Connor, Kennedy, and Thomas.62 
Disparate impact liability under the ADEA, if similar to disparate 
impact under Title VII, would provide plaintiffs with an easier method 
for proving age discrimination. Millions of American workers are over 
forty years old and may be subject to a “gray ceiling.” Prior to Smith, 
workers over forty filed nearly 18,000 charges of discrimination per 
year.63 Because plaintiffs who are unable to show that their employers 
were motivated by discrimination may prevail under disparate impact, 
 
 58. Id. 
 59. Id. 
 60. Id. at 1546 (Scalia, J., concurring) (citing Chevron U.S.A. Inc. v. Natural Res. Def. 
Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837 (1984). 
 61. See id. at 1546–47. 
 62. See Posting of Tom Goldstein to SCOTUSblog, http://www.scotusblog.com/ 
movabletype/archives/2005/06/the_54_cases_an.html (June 30, 2005, 12:22 EST). 
 63. Number of charges filed in fiscal year 2004. EEOC Statistics: ADEA Charges FY 1992-
FY 2004, http://www.eeoc.gov/stats/adea.html (last visited Nov. 7, 2005). 
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the number of employees filing charges under the new system may 
increase dramatically. 
Thus, although the decision in Smith v. Jackson appears a 
significant victory for employees, the ramifications of the decision will 
be limited—employers do not have to fear the massive liability that 
such a regime would impose. Eight Justices agreed on one issue: if the 
ADEA does authorize disparate impact claims, those claims are 
narrower than the disparate impact claims currently available under 
Title VII. Smith indicates by both overt and implied signals that 
disparate impact under the ADEA will be substantially narrower than 
under Title VII. Interestingly, the plurality, after having argued for the 
availability of disparate impact, adopted several of the concurrence’s 
points arguing that the scope of disparate impact should be limited. 
The Justices agreed that the form of disparate impact from Ward’s 
Cove Packing Co. v. Antonio64 should govern disparate impact 
available under the ADEA.65 
In Ward’s Cove, the Supreme Court narrowed the scope of 
disparate impact under Title VII.66 Two years after the Ward’s Cove 
decision, Congress amended the Court’s interpretation of disparate 
impact as part of the Civil Rights Act of 1991.67 The amendment 
broadened the scope of disparate impact under Title VII and led to a 
large increase in employer liability. According to one study, the 
number of charges of race discrimination received by the EEOC 
following the amendments increased thirteen percent and the number 
of charges of gender discrimination increased by forty-six percent.68 
At the same time, employers paid forty-seven percent more to 
plaintiffs alleging race discrimination and eighty-seven percent more 
to plaintiffs alleging gender discrimination. Notably, Congress did not 
 
 64. Ward’s Cove Packing Co. v. Antonio, 490 U.S. 642 (1989), superseded by statute, Civil 
Rights Act of 1991, Pub. L. No. 102-166, 105 Stat. 1074. 
 65. See Smith, 125 S. Ct. at 1545. 
 66. See id. 
 67. See Civil Rights Act of 1991, Pub. L. No. 102-166, § 105, 105 Stat. 1071 (codified as 
amended at 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2). See also Pub. L. No. 102-166, § 3, 105 Stat. 1071 (stating 
congressional purpose “to codify the concepts of ‘business necessity’ and ‘job related’ 
enunciated by the Supreme Court in Griggs v. Duke Power Co., and in the other Supreme Court 
decisions prior to Wards Cove Packing Co. v. Atonio”) (citations omitted). 
 68. Paul Oyer & Scott Schaefer, The Unintended Consequences of the ’91 Civil Rights Act, 
Regulation, June 2003, at 42–43, available at http://www.cato.org/pubs/regulation/v26n2-7.pdf. 
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grant a similar expansion of disparate impact under the ADEA.69 
Without a statute to overrule the Supreme Court, ADEA plaintiffs 
will have to survive the rigorous Ward’s Cove standard. 
The strongest indication that the scope of disparate impact under 
the ADEA will be narrow may be the Court’s holding in Smith that 
the plaintiffs failed to establish a claim of disparate impact. The 
plaintiffs identified the pay plan as discriminatory because it provided 
proportionally higher pay raises for employees with less seniority. The 
plurality deemed the pay plan insufficiently specific and demanded 
the plaintiffs identify a “specific test, requirement, or practice within 
the pay plan.”70 This level of specificity will often be difficult for 
plaintiffs to show because employers typically have control over 
employment practices. The plurality also shows the narrow bounds of 
disparate impact under the ADEA by accepting, without question, the 
employer’s articulated RFOA. This acceptance demonstrates that 
employers may escape liability by stating that its action was based on 
any reasonable justification other than age. The justification will not 
be subjected to a “less restrictive alternative” test, and the court will 
not question the legitimacy of the justification. 
Erwin Chemerinsky, Alston & Bird Professor of Law at Duke 
University School of Law, commented on the case, “[t]he practical 
reality is that it is often much easier for a civil rights plaintiff to prove 
disparate impact than discriminatory intent. Although the Court ruled 
that Smith failed to demonstrate impermissible impact, the Court has 
significantly opened the courthouse doors to plaintiffs bringing age 
discrimination claims.”71 For the reasons mentioned above, however, 
the decision will only aid plaintiffs in extraordinarily rare 
circumstances. The circumstances required are as follows: (1) no 
evidence of employer’s motivation to discriminate, because with such 
evidence the plaintiff could proceed under disparate treatment; (2) 
the plaintiff can point to a specific discriminatory practice within the 
adverse employment action; and (3) the employer is unable to list one 
RFOA. These requirements will almost never be shown for two 
 
 69. See Pub. L. No. 102-166, § 105 Stat. 1071 (amending the burden of proof in disparate 
impact cases for the Civil Rights Act of 1964 but not for the ADEA). 
 70. Smith, 125 S. Ct. at 1545. 
 71. So Far, a Surprising Year for Civil Rights, CALIFORNIA EVIDENCE BENCHBOOK 
NEWSLETTER v. 13 (CEB, Oakland, CA) 2005, available at http://ceb.com/newsletterv13/ 
CivilRights.htm. 
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reasons. First, employers will likely always be able to articulate one 
non-discriminatory factor in its action. Second, once the employer has 
articulated its factor, the plaintiff will only win in the event that the 
articulated non-discriminatory factor is clearly a pretext for 
discrimination. Because the Supreme Court has shown it will not 
examine the legitimacy of the articulated factor, the factor will only be 
denied with a prima facie showing of employer motivation to 
discriminate. Employer motivation to discriminate, however, means 
the plaintiff could have previously brought the claim as a disparate 
treatment claim. Future plaintiffs are likely to learn the same lesson 
as the plaintiffs in Smith found at the end of their long road to the 
Supreme Court: the inclusion of disparate impact under the ADEA is 
a hollow victory. 
 
